"The good of the grace of one soul is greater than the good of the nature of the whole universe"
- St Thomas Aquinas Ia IIa, q.24, a. 3, ad 2
by Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, O. P.
CHAPTER V: THE STANDPOINT OF ST AUGUSTINE AND HIS FIRST DISCIPLES
St. Augustine pointed out repeatedly that the fathers who wrote before the rise of the Pelagian heresy touched only incidentally upon the problem of predestination. This circumstance was noted also by St. Robert Bellarmine(1), who quotes, however, St. John Chrysostom. The latter, commenting on St. Paul's words, "For who distinguisheth thee?" says: "Therefore thou hast what thou hast received, and not only this or that, but whatever thou hast. These are not thy merits, but God's gifts." (2)
We must also observe that the fathers previous to the time of St. Augustine, especially the Greek fathers, often interpreted predestination as meaning the will to give glory after this life. They scarcely spoke of it except by way of exhortation, and then they had in mind the preconceived order of execution in which merits precede glory, whereas as intended by God it happens in the inverse order.(3) In the order of intention God wills the end before the means; that is why He wills to save the good thief to whom He grants the grace of final perseverance. But in the order of execution He gives eternal life as the reward of meritorious acts.
This distinction between the two orders of intention and execution, is a distinction which, taken in general or as regards human affairs, appeals to common sense. What the mason has in mind is the end of his labor, which is the house to be built, although this end is attained after the completion of the work. We cannot conceive of this plan of divine providence apart from this elementary condition. God from all eternity wills first the final end of the universe, which is the manifestation of His goodness, and He ordains the means which concur in this end. This will be fully realized at the end of time, when the elect, who were chosen from all eternity, have reached the end of their course.
As it always happens in such a case, this distinction between intention and execution was only gradually applied to the problem of predestination. At first it was applied obscurely by St. Augustine, and then more and more explicitly by the Scholastic theologians. Only with the rise of the Pelagian heresy did an understanding gradually develop of the necessity of considering predestination, not only in the order of execution, by way of exhortation, but also in the order of intention, so that everything pertaining to our salvation should be attributed to God. This explanatory formula we find in the writings of the earlier fathers, especially in St. John Chrysostom's commentary on the words of St. Paul: "For who is it that distinguisheth thee? Or what hast thou that thou hast not received?"(4) The principle of predilection was already obscurely expressed in these words. It thus became increasingly certain that our Lord's granting of the grace of final perseverance to the good thief in preference to the other was because He willed efficaciously to save him, and this efficacious will was from all eternity.
THE GRATUITY OF PREDESTINATION ACCORDING TO
Among the theologians who in recent times have made a study of St. Augustine's teaching about predestination, Father Cayre5() and Father J. St. Martin(6), both of them Augustinian Assumptionists, confirmed the traditional interpretation of St. Augustine's writings. We endorse their conclusions.(7)
This doctrine was more fully discussed in the treatises that St. Augustine wrote toward the end of his life.(8) It was implicitly contained in the following formula: "Lord, give what Thou commandest, and command what Thou wilt."(9)
We remarked above, at the close of the first chapter, that St. Augustine deduced from the New Testament texts referring ring to this problem, the following definition: "Predestination is the foreknowledge and the preparation of those gifts of God whereby they who are delivered are most certainly delivered."(10) In this definition the word "foreknowledge" is not taken as meaning that God foresees the merits of the elect, but that He foreknows and prepares the gifts by which the elect will actually be saved in the order of execution. St. Augustine clearly says the same: "By His predestination God foreknew what He had to do," (11)so as to direct His elect infallibly to eternal life. Our Lord's words are equivalent to this, for He said: "My sheep . . . shall not perish for ever. And no man shall pluck them out of My hand." (12)
For St. Augustine, predestination presupposes a decisive and definite will on God's part to sanctify and save freely all the elect.(13) God knows them individually and He wills to have them perform meritoriously acts that are required for entering heaven. He wills to give them the grace to persevere until the end, this being what St. Paul means when he says: "For it is God who worketh in you, both to will and to accomplish according to His good will."(14) The fact that God foresees our salutary and meritorious acts presupposes, according to the teaching of St. Augustine, the decree of the divine will as regards these acts.(15) Father Portalié considers that St. Augustine favors the theory of the scientia media because of the following sentence: "Far be it that man should have the power to frustrate the intention of the omnipotent Being who has foreknowledge of all things."(16) We know, on the contrary, that for St. Augustine the foreknowledge of our salutary acts refers to what God has decreed that created wills should do. The words that immediately follow the text quoted by Father Portalié prove this to be so, for we read: "These have but a faint conception of so great a question, or what they have does not suffice, who think that the omnipotent God wills something and is powerless to effect it because of weak man preventing Him." Father Portalié should have remarked that Molina, on the other hand, reproved St. Augustine for not having known of the scientia media.(17)
To what cause must we assign, according to the great doctor's opinion, the efficacy of grace that is granted to the elect? The principles laid down by him reveal his mind on this point. God's will, he says, is omnipotent and efficacious (most efficacious).(18) We read in one of his treatises as follows: "There is no doubt that human wills cannot resist (in sensu composito) the will of God, who hath done whatsoever He willed in heaven and on earth, in that He does what He wills and when He wills. Undoubtedly He has the power to move the human heart to submit, as it pleases Him, to His omnipotent will."(19) From this we see that, in St. Augustine's view, the decrees of the divine will are infallible not because God foreknows that we will give our consent, but because He is omnipotent. He also says: "The wills of men are more in God's power than in their own."(20) In another of his works he says: "There is no doubt that we will whenever we will, but He is the cause of our willing what is good; . . . there is no doubt that we act whenever we act, but He is the cause of our acting, by most efficaciously strengthening our will."(21) Still more clearly when speaking professedly on this subject of predestination, he says that "no one who is hardened in heart rejects grace, because it is primarily given to remove this hardness of heart.''(22)
Lastly, St. Augustine repeatedly teaches that predestination is gratuitous. And he means predestination as he defined it, which is not only to grace but also to glory; for predestination to grace alone does not lead one effectively to eternal life. It has but the name of predestination, since it belongs equally to those who, after being justified, do not persevere.
This gratuity of predestination is peculiarly stressed by him. In discussing the gift of perseverance, he says: "Of two children equally held captive by original sin, why is one taken and the other left? And of two wicked persons already advanced in years, why is one called and the other not? All this pertains to the inscrutable judgments of God."(23) He also says: "Why God draws this one and not that other, seek not to judge, if thou wilt not err."(24)
What precisely constitutes the crux of the mystery, according to St. Augustine's opinion, is man's inability to find out the reasons for the divine choice. He is continually harking back to this impossibility, and his opponents find no avenue of escape from it. This impossibility is a pledge of his fidelity to the teaching of St. Paul. It is, so to speak, the theme of his teaching.(25)
Tixeront wrote: "St. Augustine's views, considered as a whole, direct us toward the doctrine of predestination to glory before foreseen merits. . . . Were it a question of the full predestination to efficacious grace, final perseverance, and glory, and not of predestination to glory alone, there would be no room for doubt: the Bishop of Hippo insists again and again upon its absolute gratuitousness.(26)
St. Augustine’s First Disciples
1) St. Prosper of Aquitaine. After St. Augustine's death an anonymous pamphlet appeared that distorted his doctrine of predestination. St. Prosper thereupon defended the teaching of his master.(27) St. Prosper went to Rome and obtained from Pope St. Celestine in 431 a letter in which the Pontiff boldly affirmed the orthodoxy of the Bishop of Hippo, at the same time requesting the French bishops to put an end to this calumniation of St. Augustine. But St. Prosper, upon returning to France, had to refute another pamphlet that seems to have been written by St. Vincent of Lerins. This saint thought the Augustinian doctrine denied God's will to save all men and that it implied that God is the author of sin. St. Prosper refuted these conclusions(28); about 433 he wrote a book against Cassian, in which he discusses anew the problem of grace and free will.(29)
Some Pelagians put a wrong construction upon St. Paul's text that "God will have all men to be saved,"(30) and claimed that God wills equally the salvation of all. In reply to these heretics St. Augustine, arguing from the fact that all men are not saved and from the principle of the infallible efficacy of the divine will, had repeatedly spoken of a restricted will to save. By this he meant the infallibly efficacious will that leads the elect to eternal life. St. Prosper, replying to the objections made against the teaching of his master, insists upon another aspect of this doctrine. St. Augustine had clearly affirmed that "God does not command what is impossible, but in commanding admonishes thee to do what thou canst and to ask for what thou canst not do."(31) God never commands what is impossible, otherwise no one could avoid committing actual sin, which in this case would no longer be a sin, and the divine chastisements inflicted for such would be a manifest injustice. To say that God never commands the impossible means that He wills to make it really possible for all to comply with the precepts imposed upon them and to do so when they are imposed. Thus He wills to make their salvation really possible, though He does not lead them all efficaciously to eternal life. Moreover, St. Augustine again and again, without adding any restrictions, explained St. Paul's text that "Christ dies for all."(32)
True to the teaching of his master, St. Prosper wrote as follows: "We must most sincerely believe and profess that God wills all men to be saved. For this, indeed, is the mind of the Apostle, who most urgently commands, what is a most devout custom in all the churches, that suppliant prayers be offered to God for all men. That many of these perish is the fault of those who perish: that many are saved is the gift of Him who saves."(33)
In these words of St. Prosper we have formulated the two extreme aspects of the mystery. On the one hand we have God's will to save all men, and on the other hand we have the mystery of predestination, namely, that many are saved is the gift of Him who saves.(34) Concerning predestination in the strict sense of the term, St. Prosper is equally firm in his defense of St. Augustine's opinion, and he refuses to identify predestination with foreknowledge, because God foresees the bad no less than the good acts, but He positively wills and is the cause of only the latter.(35) He is the author of all good, and it cannot be said that, irrespective of His divine will, one particular person is better than another. Predestination implies, therefore, along with foreknowledge a love of predilection or the will to effect in a particular person and by means of him in preference to a certain other, this salutary good by which such a person will actually merit and attain eternal life.(36) Therefore predestination of the elect is gratuitous, as St. Augustine had said.
If St. Prosper mitigated his master's teaching on any point, it was on the question of reprobation. He is not satisfied with merely speaking of souls left by God in the mass of perdition, for he considers that reprobation is the result of personal sins foreseen by God.(37) This way of viewing it cannot be maintained as the reason for the non-election of children who die without being baptized. As for the reprobate adults, it leaves the question still shrouded in obscurity: their personal sins, which are foreseen by God, could not happen without His divine permission. Again, why has God permitted certain individuals to commit sins without efficaciously intending that their sins should be actually forgiven, whereas He permits sins in the case of the elect only to bring them to a truer humility, by which their love becomes purer?
We shall see farther on that many of St. Augustine's disciples who, considering themselves to be interpreting the mind of their master more faithfully, distinguish between negative reprobation (non-election and the will to permit sins that will not be forgiven), and positive reprobation (eternal decree to inflict the punishment of damnation for sins foreseen). Negative reprobation, so they say, cannot be the result of personal sins foreseen by God as not calling for His forgiveness; for it means nothing else but God's permission of these sins which, unless He permitted them, could not be foreseen by Him. This proved, later on, to be the teaching of St. Thomas,(38) and it seems to be fully in agreement with what St. Augustine taught.(39)
2) The author of a certain treatise(40) written between 430 and 460 – which was about the period in which St. Prosper lived – like a true disciple of St. Augustine, admits God's will to save all men, at the same time maintaining the gratuity of predestination. To explain this will to save all men, he insists upon a general grace for salvation that is offered to all, and he distinguishes between this and a special and entirely gratuitous grace that is given to those who are actually saved. In addition to these general gifts . . . there is the liberal bestowal of a special grace.(41) This special grace is the effect of a divine predilection.
3) St. Fulgentius. At the end of the sixth century the controversies on grace and predestination were resumed after the death of the Semipelagian bishop Faustus of Riez. St. Fulgentius of Ruspe then wrote a little treatise on this subject.(42) He followed this up with an important letter on the question of grace(43) and wrote a work comprising seven books in direct refutation of the teachings of Faustus. Of this work only one treatise remains.(44) Last of all he wrote a work in vindication of the truth of predestination and grace.(45) St. Fulgentius, who is called "Augustine in miniature," adopts as his own the whole of St. Augustine's teaching on grace and its gratuity.(46) He accepts, too, everything his master teaches about predestination. Complete predestination, which means to glory and to grace, is considered by him to be absolutely free, certain, and restricted. It is absolutely free because grace, without which man is incapable of performing any salutary good work, is purely a gift of God's mercy.(47) Predestination is a certainty in virtue of God's omnipotent and unchangeable will.(48) Finally, it is restricted to the elect, who are called in manifestation of God's merciful goodness in their behalf. (49)
Concerning God's will to save, in those texts in which St. Fulgentius speaks of the divine and infallibly efficacious will to save, he limits it, as St. Augustine did.(50) He does not deny, however, this other point of Augustinian teaching, that "God does not command what is impossible." He really wills to stake it possible for all to fulfil His precepts, for this is the way by which one attains eternal life. St. Fulgentius positively rejects predestination to sin,(51) and he explains that those whom God has not elected are justly abandoned by Him either because of original sin, or because of pride which is the result of this sin. (52)
4) St. Caesarius of Arles (470-543) His sermons are also a faithful reflection of St. Augustine's teaching on predestination. Father Lejay says: "The problem of both salvation and damnation is solved in the same way as St. Augustine solved it. If the wickedness of sinners induces to hardness of heart, it is God who removes this by His grace. If we ask why God gives grace to some and refuses it to others, Caesarius answers by saying with St. Augustine: As a rule God's judgments are hidden from the knowledge of men, but they are not unjust. Like St. Augustine, he counterattacks by quoting the well-known Pauline texts: O the depths of the riches of the wisdom and of the knowledge of God! O man who art thou that repliest against God?"(53)
From this we see, however, that St. Caesarius, like his master, distinguishes between God's permission of sin, without which this would not happen, and the withdrawal of His grace which, as a just punishment, presupposes on the contrary that God foresees the sin. With this in mind he writes: "Pharao is hardened in heart by the withdrawal of grace, but also because of his wickedness."(54) In this there is a mystery, that God permits sins that will not be forgiven. God often remits sins which He has permitted, often enough, but not always. This, too, is a mystery.
5) The Second Council of Orange (529), in which the influence of St. Caesarius of Arles preponderated, put an end to the heated discussions between the Augustinians and the anti-Augustinians in France, by approving the fundamental points maintained by St. Augustine. The first eight canons of the council were taken by St. Caesarius from St. Augustine's works. Another proposition was added by the Bishop of Arles (c. 10), and then there are sixteen propositions (c. 9 and 11-25) compiled by St. Prosper from St. Augustine's works and sent by Pope Felix IV. Pope Boniface II, his successor, confirmed (January 25, 531) these decisions in which Rome had already played an important part, and he declared the profession of faith formulated by the synod to be in agreement with the Catholic principles of the fathers.
These canons of the Council of Orange clearly affirm not only the necessity of grace for every supernaturally good work, but also its gratuity. By this ruling the council definitely steered clear of Semipelagianism. On the question whether the efficacy of grace, of which the council speaks, is intrinsic or extrinsic, in other words, whether or not it depends upon the fact that God foresees our consent, modern theologians are not in agreement. Those who, like the Augustinians and the Thomists, admit the intrinsic efficacy of grace, quote especially the following canons: (3) "If anyone says that God's grace can be conferred by the invocation of man, and that this, however, is not caused by grace itself, such a person contradicts the prophet Isaias or the Apostle who says: I was found by them that did not seek Me: I appeared openly to them that asked not after Me."(55) (4) "If anyone says that God waits for us to will that we may be cleansed from sin, and who does not confess that even our wish to be cleansed from sin is the effect of the infusion and operation of the Holy Spirit who by the mouth of Solomon says: The will is prepared by the Lord, and also the Apostle proclaiming for our benefit that: it is God who worketh in you, both to will and
to accomplish according to His good will."(56) (6) "If anyone . . . does not consent to believe it to be the gift of grace itself, that we be obedient and humble, resists the Apostle who says: What hast thou that thou hast not received? and By the grace of God I am what I am."(57) (9) "For as often as we do what is good, God works in and with us that we may do it." (58)(10) "We must always implore God's help even for those who have been baptized and cured of their spiritual infirmities, whether this be that they may persevere in the performance of good works or that they may die a happy death."(59) (12) "God loves us because of what we will be by the gift of His grace, not because of what we are by our own merit."(60) (20) "There is no good act done by man which God does not help man to do."(61) (22) "No one has for one's own anything but lying and sin."(62) Later on theology stated more precisely that man can perform no supernaturally good act except by God's supernatural help, and no morally good deed without a help in the natural order.
The Council of Orange makes no positive affirmation about predestination to glory and grace; but we see that this is the logical result of the canons just quoted, especially of canons twelve and twenty. The latter canon reads: "There is no good act done by man which God does not help man to do." Canon twelve declares that "God loves us because of what we will be by the gift of His grace, not because of what we are by our own merit." These two statements along with the Pauline text: "What has thou that thou hast not received?"(63) are tantamount to saying that one would not be better than another if one were not loved more and helped more by God, and that in the work of salvation everything comes from God, in this sense that we cannot detect therein the least good which could be said to be exclusively from ourselves and not from Him.
The Indiculus de Gratia Dei, appended to Pope Celestine's twenty-first letter, said the same: "For the acknowledgment of God's grace, the operative power and dignity of which must not in the least be undervalued, we believe that whatever the canons have taught us in accordance with the aforesaid rules laid down by the Holy See is amply sufficient: so that we absolutely do not think is Catholic what has clearly been seen to be contrary to the foregoing decisions." (64)
Finally, the Council of Orange distinctly disapproves of predestination to evil. On this point it says: "That some are predestined by divine power to evil, not only we do not believe this, but also, if there are any willing to believe so great an evil, in all detestation we anathematize them."(65) In the same paragraph the council affirms that all the baptized can he saved if they will keep the commandments, for we read: "This also we believe according to Catholic faith, that all those who have received grace by being baptized, Christ helping and co-operating with them, if they have willed to labor faithfully, can and ought to put into effect those things that pertain to the salvation of their souls."(66) This is what St. Augustine said, whom the Council of Trent quoted against the Protestants as follows: "God does not command what is impossible, but in commanding advises you to do what you can and to ask for what you cannot do,"(67) and again when he said: "God does not abandon those whom He has once justified by His grace, unless He is first abandoned by them." (68)
Thus the two extreme aspects of the mystery were affirmed: oil the one hand, the gratuity and necessity of grace; and on the other, the real possibility of salvation, at least for all the baptized.
6) After the Council of Orange. St. Gregory the Great is also distinctly of the Augustinian school. He teaches the ne¬cessity of a prevenient grace for the beginning of good works and faith(69), and that predestination to grace and eternal life is absolutely gratuitous, as in the case of the good thief(70). In the seventh century, St. Isidore of Seville also taught that the elect are gratuitously predestined to heaven(71), and that God has prepared for the reprobates the punishments they have deserved for their sins which have been permitted by Him. To the question why God has freely chosen some and not others, St. Isidore answers by saying: "In an obscurity so great as this it is of no avail for man to investigate the divine dispensation and examine the secret arrangements of predestination." (72)
Such is the teaching of St. Augustine's disciples. They affirm the two extreme aspects of the mystery: the gratuity of predestination and the real possibility of salvation for at least all baptized adults. Moreover all agree in saying that no one in this life can see how these two truths are intimately reconciled, for that would be to see how God's infinite justice, infinite mercy, and sovereign independence or liberty are intimately reconciled. The just mean was found in the affirmation of these two extreme aspects of the mystery and in the higher contemplation of God's infinite goodness, which is equally the principle of His mercy and that of His justice. On the one hand, God's sovereign goodness is diffusive of itself, it being the principle of His mercy; on the other hand, it has the right to be loved above all things, it being the principle of His justice.
St. Augustine's disciples steered a middle course by a loving contemplation of these truths in the obscurity of faith. This middle course was compromised in the ninth century by the assertions of Gottschalk, which necessitated many a struggle for its restoration.(73)
1. De gratia et libero arbitrio, II, 14.
2. In I Cor., 4:7, hom. 12
3. Cf. Dict. de Théol. Cath., art. "Prédestination," by Father Simonin, O.P.
We are aware of the two different interpretations of the teaching of the Greek fathers on this point. Petavius is of the opinion that they side with those who believe in predestination after foreseen merits. Thomassin maintains they taught predestination before foreseen merits.
In the above-mentioned article Father Simonin concludes that the Greek fathers "neither stated nor solved the problem of predestination, as to whether this is before or after foreseen merits; for this often presupposes a conjecture that directly concerns the divine intention." They considered rather in a concrete and practical manner the execution of the divine plan.
4. I Cor. 4: 7.
Précis de patrologie, I, 664-77.
6. Dict. de théol. cath., art. "Prédestination."
7. Father J. St. Martin (loc. Cit., col. 2853) insists, and rightly so, upon the importance of knowing whether the predestined are predestined for grace only or also to glory. This knowledge is necessary even for a delineation of St. Augustine's teaching. Let us recall here the question that gave rise to so much dispute. The Semipelagians did and could admit only predestination to grace. It was a grace, too, which, according to their interpretation, depended for its efficacy on free will alone. St. Augustine was particularly vehement in refuting this theory, for he knew quite well that this was the summing up and pivotal point of the error. According to the teaching of St. Augustine, the reality of predestination consists in the gift of final perseverance, and without this latter there is no predestination, notwithstanding all the other graces received. The holy doctor is not in the least doubt about this.
Cf. De correptione et gratia; De dono persever., De praed. sanct.
Ad Simplicianum, Bk. I; De dono persever., no. 53 Confessions, X, 37, no. 60
10. De dono persever., chap. 14.
De praed. sanct., chap. 10.
12. John 10: 27-28.
13. Cf. Enchiridion, chap. 100, no. 26.
Phil. 2: 13; cf. De praed. sanct., XVIII, 41; De dono persever., XXIII, 63.
De dono persever., XVII, 41, 47; XIX, 48; XX, 50; De praed. sanct., XVII, 34; XVIII, 37.
Dict. de théol. cath., art. “Augustin.” This sentence is taken from St. Augustine’s Opus imperfectum contra Julianum, I, 93
Cf. Concordia, ed. 1876, p. 546.
Cf. Enchiridion, chaps. 95 ff.
De correptione et gratia, chap. 14.
Ibid., cf. De civitate Dei, V, 9.
De gratia et libero arbitrio, chap. 16.
22. De praed. Sanct., chap. 8. In his tractae ad Simplicandum, Bk. I, q.2, no. 13, St. Augustine speaks of a congruent grace that is adapted to the dispositions of the individual, these being known by God. Some have sought to interpret this as meaning a congruent grace that is not intrinsically efficacious, such as we shall see later on Suarez conceives it to be. Father Guillermin pointed out (Revue Thomiste, 1902, p. 658) that St. Augustine has in mind “an active and victorious congruency.” In a word, the grace is intrinsically efficacious.
23. De dono persever., chap.9
In Joan., tr. 26
De dono persever., VIII, 17; IX, 12, 21; XI, 25; XII, 30. De praed. sanct., VIII, 16; XIV, 26. De correptione et gratia, VIII, 17, 19(in the order of execution).
History of dogmas, Bk. II, p. 503; cf. Enchiridion, chaps. 98, 99; Ep., 186, no. 15; De dono persever., chaps. 17, 25.
PL, LI, 155-175. Pro Augustino responsiones ad capitula objectionum Gallorum calumniantium.
28. Cf. ibid., 177-86; Pro Augustino responsiones ad capitula objectionum vincentianarum.
Cf. Liber ad collatorem, ibid., 213-76
I Tim. 2:4.
De natura et gratis, PL, XLIII, 50; XLIV, 271
11 Cor. 5: 15; cf. PL, XLIV, 825; XLV, 1217.
PL, LI, 179; cf. Resp. ad 8 obj. Gallorum vincent., ibid., 162.
Concerning St. Prosper's point of view on this question, consult P.M. Jacquin's article entitled "La question de la prédestination aux Ve et Vie siècles, "in the Revue d'hist. eccles., VII, 269-300; J. Tixeront, History of dogmas, III, pp. 283-93; Cayré, Précis de patrologie, II, 180-85.
35. PL, LI, 170.
Ibid., 174. Resp. ad cap. Gall.
Summa theol., Ia, q. 23, a.5 ad 3um.
PL, XLIV, 580, 965.
Ibid., LI, 647-72. De vocatione omnium gentium
42. PL, LXV, 451-93. Liber de incarnatione et gratia Domini nostri Jesu Christi.
Ibid., 151-206, Ad Monimum. Columns 153-78 are concerned with predestination.
Ibid., Ad Monimum, 157-60, 162-63.
Ibid., 603-27, De veritate praed.
Ibid., Ad Monimum, 161.
Ibid., Ad Monimum, 172-74; De verit. Praed., 644-45.
Ibid., 658 ff. Ep. 441.
Ibid., Ad Monimum, 155-57, 166-78.
Cf. Dict. de théol., II, 2178; Caesarius of Arles, Sermons, XXII, 4;CCLXXV, 1; Rom. 11:33; 9:20
54. Sermon XXII.
Denz., no. 176; cf. Rom. 10:20; Is. 65:1.
Ibid., no. 172; Prov. 8:25; Phil. 2:13.
Ibid., no. 179; I Cor. 4:7; 15:10.
Ibid., no. 182.
59. Ibid., no. 183.
Ibid., no. 185.
Ibid., no. 193.
Ibid., no. 195.
I Cor. 4:7.
Denz., nos. 134, 135, 139, 142.
Ibid., no. 200
Ibid., no. 804; cf. PL, XLIII, 50.
68. PL, XXVI, 29.
Ibid., LXXV, 1135.
Ibid., LXXVI, 436-37.
Ibid., LXXXIII, 606.
Ibid., 606, no. 6.
Ibid., CXXI, 347-66